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Abstract
Global climate change is arguably the deﬁ ning issue of the present age, and high carbon emissions are 
the major cause of this change. Prior research has shown that carbon emissions are strongly positively 
associated with household incomes – both in a given nation and between nations. Scholars explain 
that one of the root causes of this “income-carbon” relationship is lifestyle lock-in: the inability of indi-
viduals to change their consumption habits – due to institutionalized structures, contexts, and norms. 
Using a United States nationally representative dataset (N=2107), I test whether climate change 
beliefs moderate the income-carbon relationship (emissions were only examined for personal mobility 
and dietary carbon footprints). I found a signiﬁ cant positive correlation between climate change 
beliefs and personal carbon footprints only among one segment of the public – those who are most con-
cerned about climate change (18% of the sample). I also reaﬃ  rm the signiﬁ cant positive correlation 
between household income and carbon emissions – income was the most dominant predictor variable 
in my analyses. I call for taxes and limits on both income and carbon emissions.
Keywords: personal carbon footprint, environmentally signiﬁ cant behavior, attitude-behavior gap, 
lifestyle lock-in, climate change belief
1. INTRODUCTION
Climate scientists warn that human activities – primarily in the area of carbon emissi-
ons and the burning of fossil fuels – have tipped the planetary climate “oﬀ  balance”. 
Th ere are also reports of impending environmental catastrophes and extreme costs if the 
current climate imbalance is not remedied. In this study, I examine the income-carbon 
relationship – the established signiﬁ cant association between personal income, personal 
consumption behaviors, and resultant carbon emissions (i.e. the way humans consume 
in relation to their income) – and I test whether climate change belief can moderate this 
relationship. My country of research is the United States and I use a broad, nationally 
representative, climate change belief construct to test possible moderating eﬀ ects. As 
informed by the literature, I hypothesize that, due to normative and structural constra-
ints, climate change belief would not moderate the income carbon relationship. 
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In my results, I reject the null hypothesis as survey respondents with the strongest cli-
mate change beliefs did slightly moderate the income-carbon relationship. Th ough this 
moderation aﬀ ect does exist, it is only slight, while income – as elaborated in the litera-
ture – is the most dominant independent variable in my analyses. In this paper, I review 
the pertinent literature, present my data and research methodology, discuss my ﬁ ndings 
and conclude with recommendations. 
Th is study is based on a cultural approach; my interest is in how individual attitudes 
and actions might assist in eﬀ orts to mitigate global climate change. However, like 
other scholars, I believe a more structural institutional level approach – as opposed to 
cultural / individual – is most eﬀ ective for reducing carbon emissions related to human 
activities. 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In light of the looming crisis of climate change (IPCC, 2014a; Melillo et al., 2014; Za-
lasiewicz et al., 2015), there is a wave of scholarship directed at trying to understand and 
change human-environmental attitudes and behaviors, especially carbon-emissions re-
lated behaviors (Brulle, 2010; Dietz et al., 2009; Maibach et al., 2008; McCright, 2009; 
McKenzie-Mohr, 2011).1 However, with respect to carbon emissions, they are not emit-
ted equally by all persons (Hertwich and Peters, 2009): a great majority originates from 
people with higher levels of income and more industrialized nations (Chichilnisky and 
Heal, 1994; IPCC, 2014b; Munasinghe, 2010; World Bank, 2015).2, 3
A number of studies have analyzed the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG-
Es) within industrialized nations and found they are positively correlated with per-
sonal income (Dey, 2010; Druckman and Jackson, 2009; Ummel, 2014; Wilson et al., 
2013).4 Th us, as income is known to be distributed unequally, there are also carbon 
emission inequalities (Chancel, 2014; Ummel, 2014). In the U.S., K. Ummel (2014) 
observed that “the top 20% of polluters account for 40% of all GHG pollution… 
1 Th e terms GHGs, carbon, carbon footprint, CO2 and CO2e are used synonymously: they refer to the 
emitted greenhouse gases and carbon dioxide / CO2 equivalents emitted during any part of the human 
extraction, processing, production, distribution, consumption, or dumping of a product / good.
2 Th ough there is a global shift toward lower income countries as the dominant source points of greenhouse 
gases (embodied in products, consumption, and international trade), consumers in industrialized countries 
remain the primary end users of this embodied carbon (Caldeira and Davis, 2011; Davis and Caldeira, 
2010; Peters et al., 2011).
3 Analyses of the environmental impacts of aﬄ  uent versus poorer countries are not new (Ehrlich and 
Holdren, 1971).
4 Income-carbon correlations have been found in the United States (Jones and Kammen, 2014; Ummel, 
2014), the United Kingdom (Druckman and Jackson, 2008, 2009), Australia (Dey, 2010; Lenzen and 
Murray, 2001), Canada (Wilson, Tyedmers, and Spinney, 2013), and Th e Netherlands (Gatersleben et al., 
2002).
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[while] the lowest-emitting 40% of the population (largely individuals in lower income 
groups) are responsible for just 20%” (2014:12).5 
When attempting to explain the causes of these economically stratiﬁ ed and geospatially 
dispersed GHGEs, scholars tend toward two explanations: consumer lifestyle and “lock-
in”. Lifestyle is a term which identiﬁ es and classiﬁ es group behaviors, expenditures, and 
energy use patterns (Bin and Dowlatabadi, 2005; Schipper et al., 1989; Weber and 
Perrels, 2000).6 Some scholars explain lifestyle as the outcome of individuals just try-
ing to meet their needs and wants (Druckman and Jackson, 2009), and high emissions 
associated with higher income groups reﬂ ect desires for more goods, services, luxuries, 
and comforts (Zhang et al., 2015:6). Observing this income / lifestyle / energy-use 
relationship, Gatersleben et al. posit that “as soon as people have the ﬁ nancial ability 
to perform the behavior, they are tempted to do so” (2002:354). Sanne (2002:280) 
presents a similar view with what he calls the “ratchet eﬀ ect”: the more money people 
have, the more they buy, and the more they buy, the more money they need to support 
themselves.
“Lock-in”, the other predominant explanation for the stratiﬁ cation of GHGEs – not 
to be considered separate from lifestyle as much as part of it – is best deﬁ ned as cultural 
and structural constraint. Th ese constraints are generally explained as institutionalized 
structures, contexts, and norms (Chancel, 2014; Guagnano et al., 1995; Jackson, 2005; 
Sanne, 2002; Th ogersen, 2005).7 Druckman and Jackson (2009) assert that it is diﬃ  cult 
to change both individual and institutional norms and, by extension, it is the aﬄ  uent 
who should be targeted with new policies. Druckman and Jackson (2009) also allude 
to more than one type of lock-in: one which is more institutional / structural and the 
other more normative / cultural.8
Th is dichotomizing of strategies (cultures versus structures and individuals versus in-
stitutions) to assuage the planetary impacts of human behavior is supported by others; 
although structural / institutional level changes are seen as the most eﬀ ective approach 
to climate change mitigation (IPCC, 2014a; Princen et al., 2002; Szasz, 2011), lifestyle 
and personal behaviors are also a key area for research and intervention (Dietz et al., 
2009; Nagel et al., 2010; Tucker, 1978). Moreover, at this critical historical juncture, it 
appears that what can be done, should be done.
5 Studies have also found that geospatial distribution (urban, suburban, rural) and population densities are 
also important determinants of GHGEs (Jones and Kammen, 2014; Ummel, 2014). Zhang et al. (2015), 
Lyons et al. (2012), and Fahmy et al. (2011) report similar ﬁ ndings in China, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom respectively.
6 Additionally, lifestyle can also include residence location, family size, age cohort, and size of house or 
apartment (Chancel, 2014).
7 Sanne (2002) asserts that people are not happy to be constrained by their circumstances, but feel locked-
in.
8 Th e phenomenon of a ﬁ nite planet itself presents a third type of lock-in, a biophysical one. Th erefore, a 
possible “collision of lock-ins” can be theorized.
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2.1. Probing Climate Change, Lifestyles, and Cultural Lock-In
In light of this global climate urgency, I attempt to dig deeper into human behavioral 
norms, the issue of lock-in, and consumption lifestyles by researching at the individual 
level with a cultural perspective. I also intend to ground my approach sociologically and in 
a class cultural perspective (Bourdieu, [1979]1984). Th is means that lifestyles are not con-
sidered benign, arbitrary phenomena, but are inculcated from childhood, as an individual 
habitus – an unconscious system of predispositions – in relation to certain socio-economic 
ﬁ elds with respect to one’s speciﬁ c class fraction and conditions of existence. Practically, 
then, individuals from distinct classes will be inclined to remain culturally “stationary” – 
i.e. locked-in – with respect to their inculcated predispositions which match them to cer-
tain positions in social space. Th is theoretical approach, then, suggests that not only might 
there be an income-carbon relationship, but also a relationship between class culture and 
carbon emissions, as might be deduced from Bourdieusian theory ([1979]1984).
Concerning attitudes about climate change, as a minority of people in the United States 
believe that climate change is both occurring and human-caused (Guber, 2013; Lei-
serowitz et al., 2012; Nisbet and Myers, 2007). I am interested in how awareness of 
climate change may aﬀ ect behavior; speciﬁ cally, the relationship between an individual’s 
climate change belief and GHGEs.9 I am also interested in examining, while control-
ling for income, any changes in environmentally signiﬁ cant behavior – via estimations of 
GHGEs – with respect to one’s belief in anthropogenic (human-caused) climate change 
(ACC).10
It must be noted that there is an important methodological distinction upon which I 
am building: pro-environmental behavior versus environmentally signiﬁ cant behavior.11 
In response to much research on pro-environmental behavior, of which ﬁ ndings are 
dominated by survey data and self-reports (Capstick et al., 2015; Diamantopoulos et 
al., 2003), environmentally signiﬁ cant behavior has emerged.12 In this new development, 
9 In 2012, Leiserowitz et al. reported that only 38% of their sample agreed that global warming was both 
happening and mostly human-caused; with such a split in the U.S. between “believers” and “non-believers”, 
this is an opportune time to explore these phenomena.
10 Th e term belief – and other terms related to it – such as non-belief, disbelief, believers or deniers – may 
be seen to invoke a type of religious discourse or dynamic in a debate over climate science. However, use 
of the term belief in this study refers to the aﬃ  rmative response of survey participants to a question such 
as, “Do you think that global warming [or climate change] is happening? Yes, No, or I don’t know”. In 
response, there are people who think climate change is happening, those who think it is not, and those who 
“do not know”.
11 Over the years, diﬀ erent scholars have used diﬀ erent synonyms for pro-environmental behavior: envi-
ronmentally responsible (Fransson and Gärling, 1999; Hines et al., 1987), friendly (Gärling et al., 2009; 
Haustein and Hunecke, 2007), or sustainable behavior (Griskevicius et al., 2012; Kurz, 2002; McKenzie-
Mohr, 2011), and also conservation (Kaiser et al., 2005; Schultz et al., 2005), or ecologically conscious 
behavior (Ellen et al., 1991; Roberts and Bacon, 1997). 
12 Besides critiquing the dominance of polling data in the literature, Capstick et al. (2015) also identify 
a lack of consistency in the construction of belief measures and call for an increase in qualitative research.
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scholars have focused on identifying and quantifying actual environmental impacts as 
distinct from self-reported environmental behaviors (Clements et al., 2015; Martis-
kainen, 2007; Stern, 2000b). It is not so much that research on environmentally sig-
niﬁ cant behavior foregoes all self-reported behavior as much as it focuses on the actual 
material / environmental impacts of such reports.13 In this present study, my interest is 
in environmentally signiﬁ cant behavior, but ﬁ rst I will review the research on climate 
change belief.
2.2. Climate Change Belief
Th ere is actually not a lot of research on the relationship between climate change at-
titudes and environmentally signiﬁ cant behavior.14 When strictly analyzing attitudes on 
climate change, though, some scholars have identiﬁ ed a debate embedded in opposition-
ally poised cultural worldviews – hierarchical individualists versus egalitarian commu-
nitarians: attitudes that preexist in respondents (Kahan et al., 2012). Th ese worldviews 
undergird much of the debate on ACC and are found to be the strongest predictors 
of perceptions of climate change risk (Kahan et al., 2012). Th us, these scholars assert 
that it is preexisting worldviews – not a lack of information, scientiﬁ c understanding, 
or even political orientation – that most strongly determine climate change attitudes.15
Other studies have also found survey responses oppositionally polarized, but over politi-
cal ideology and party lines (Dunlap and McCright, 2008; Guber, 2013; Leiserowitz et 
al., 2011, 2012; Perkowiz et al., 2014). Additionally, Leiserowitz et al. (2009) identiﬁ ed 
six respondent groups / segments: Alarmed, Concerned, Cautious, Disengaged, Doubtful, 
and Dismissive. Figure 1 below displays these segments for the fall of 2008, with their 
respective population distributions represented by the size of each sphere.16 Th e ques-
tioning schemes that determine these diﬀ erent segments range from belief about global 
warming to risk perceptions, degree of worry, reported energy use behaviors, and prefer-
ences with respect to possible societal responses (Maibach et al., 2011). Th ough there 
13 For a review of this literature, see Osbaldiston and Schott (2012).
14 Most of the existing literature examines self-assessed respondent behaviors, but aside from climate 
change, scholars have long studied consumption patterns and have tried to understand their relationship 
to demographic indicators, ecological attitudes, and environmental concern (Balderjahn, 1988; Jones and 
Dunlap, 1992; Kassarjian, 1971; Shove, 2003; Stern, 2000a). However, the relationship between envi-
ronmental and climate attitudes is still being explored, i.e. although ACC alarm has grown (Melillo et al., 
2014) with some ﬂ uctuations, attitudes and environmental concern – both nationally and internationally 
– have remained stable (Franzen and Vogl, 2013; Jones and Dunlap, 1992).
15 Kahan et al. (2012:733) deﬁ ne this dynamic as cultural cognition: “the conforming of beliefs to the ones 
that predominate within one’s group”. Th us, when they were expecting one’s scientiﬁ c literacy to increase 
perceived risk, they instead found a polarized split in accordance with one’s groups’ individualist or com-
munitarian worldview.
16 Th ough there are more recent and up-to-date ﬁ ndings on climate change belief segmentation in the 
US, data from 2008 is presented because this is the year that the (carbon calculable) behavioral questions 
I analyze were asked.
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is some variation demographically, the six segments are not very diﬀ erent: the strongest 
predictor variable of segmentation is political orientation, e.g., whether a respondent is 
more liberal, conservative, Republican, Democrat, Independent or other. Liberals are 
more inclined to the population segments to the left (of Figure 1) and conservatives 
more to the right. Th us, the literature posits that asking someone their beliefs about 
climate change will reveal more than just beliefs; it is akin to asking, “What is your 
ideological tribe?” Additionally, these beliefs and these “tribes” invoke grander institu-
tional narratives and culturo-politico-economic tensions between groups with diﬀ erent 
views on nature and fairness (Douglas et al., 1998; Rayner and Malone, 1998). In the 
words of Rayner and Malone (1998:24), the “…debate about climate change is often a 














Highest Belief in Global Warming
Most Concerned
Most Motivated
Lowest Belief in Global Warming
Least Concerned
Least Motivated
Figure 1.  Six Americas adult population segmentation (Leiserowitz et al., 2009:3)
Th ere are also other studies that suggest a socioeconomic connection to ACC belief. 
During the recession of 2008, economic concerns prevailed with studies detecting a 
decline in ACC belief (Newport, 2010; Pew, 2009; Saad, 2009). Postmaterialist / pros-
perity arguments posit that there exists a well-educated, left-leaning middle-class with 
the time and ability to be concerned about ecological issues (Franzen and Meyer, 2010; 
Inglehart, 1990).17 Th ere are mixed ﬁ ndings on such a thesis, with some scholars ﬁ nding 
evidence of a somewhat stable cultural ﬁ eld of ecological views and practices expanding 
across class boundaries (Carfagna et al., 2014; Laidley, 2013) – what Carfagna et al. 
(2014) call an eco-habitus – while other scholars ﬁ nd little or no “prosperity” tendencies: 
17 Seemingly conﬁ rming this argument, at the international level there is evidence of greater environmen-
tal concern in wealthier countries (Franzen and Vogl, 2013), but when using diﬀ erent measures, there is 
evidence that ﬁ nds relations between wealth and environmental concern inconclusive (Dunlap and York, 
2008).
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(i) in countries with higher levels of income inequality (Dolenec et al., 2014), or (ii) 
when respondents consider the trade-oﬀ s between economic growth and environmen-
tal protection (Domazet et al., 2014). Furthermore, other scholars ﬁ nd that those of 
higher classes are more politically engaged on climate issues (Dietz et al., 2007; Leise-
rowitz et al., 2012; McCright, 2009). Nevertheless, these studies are primarily attitudi-
nally focused and do not assess actual respondent behaviors or their ecological impacts. 
Th erefore, it might be assumed that an increase in environmental concern does reduce 
environmental impacts, but this speciﬁ c relationship – at least in these studies – was not 
measured.
2.3. Attitude-Behavior Gap
Although scholars have long examined the environmental attitude / behavior relation-
ship (Diamantopoulos et al., 2003; Osbaldiston and Schott, 2012), when it comes to 
assessing environmentally signiﬁ cant behavior, the literature shows that the eﬀ ects of an 
individual’s concern for the environment are annulled by the eﬀ ects of their income 
(Csutora, 2012; Gatersleben et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 2013).18 Th erefore, scholars 
assert that even if the aﬄ  uent have high levels of environmental concern, they still use 
more energy and emit more GHGs than their lower income counterparts. Furthermore, 
when compared to those similarly situated socioeconomically, there is no comparable 
diﬀ erence in ecological impact between those with high or low levels of environmental 
concern. Th is is the attitude-behavior gap (A-B gap): the general inability, all along the 
socio-economic hierarchy, of ecological consciousness to signiﬁ cantly reduce human 
impacts on the environment.19 In other words, the A-B gap is present when self-report-
ed behaviors do not align with self-reported attitudes (Blake, 1999; Hoggett, 2013; 
Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002; Whitmarsh et al., 2011).20
18 Th ese particular studies, though, were not conducted in the U.S. – Csutora (2012) in Hungary, Gater-
sleben et al. (2002) in the Netherlands, and Wilson et al. (2013) in Nova Scotia, Canada – nor did they spe-
ciﬁ cally focus on climate change attitudes; this is the underdeveloped area of research that I plan to explore.
19 Csutora (2012) found that there is less variance in the ecological footprint for individuals of lower 
income. Th is may be reﬂ ective of Bourdieu’s ([1979]1984) concept of proximity to necessity and limited 
lifestyle options. Relatedly, Whitmarsh (2009:13) observed that “those who take action to conserve energy 
generally do so for reasons unconnected to the environment (e.g., to save money)”.
20 Verplanken (2011) asserts that in light of the A-B gap researchers should strictly focus on changing 
behaviors and disregard changing attitudes. Lertzman (2013) questions the whole existence of a gap, argu-
ing that it is an outcome of shortcomings in measures and the oft contradictory and illusive nature of the 
human subject itself. Others add that measures of environmental attitudes are often inﬂ ated as they are 
rarely ranked alongside other personal and social concerns (Guber, 2013), i.e. relative to one’s economic 
priorities or a “pool of worry” (Linville and Fischer, 1991). Some assert – in accord with cultural lock-in 
– that social norms obstruct an individual’s ability to behave in accord with their attitudes (Newhouse, 
1990). To be clear, the idea that there is a gap between self-reported and actual behavior is not new (LaPiere, 
1934; Schuman and Johnson, 1976; Wicker, 1969). Additionally, the A-B gap is reminiscent of a number 
of adages: the spirit is willing but the ﬂ esh is weak; actions speak louder than words; walk the talk; put your 
money where your mouth is, etc. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN
In light of this literature, I conducted this study in the United States and used ACC 
belief as an indicator of environmental awareness. I tested ACC belief against GHGEs 
calculations for mobility / transportation and dietary behaviors / carbon-footprints.21 
Th is speciﬁ c combination of factors is unique in literature.22 Additionally, in light of the 
phenomena of lock-in, the A-B gap, and my hypothesis, moving forward – reﬂ ective of 
the literature that attitudes on climate change will not moderate the eﬀ ects of income 
on carbon emissions, I decided: (i) to use the strongest form of climate change belief 
available – that survey respondents perceive climate change as human-caused (anthro-
pogenic) and dangerous (they are deeply concerned about it and report that they have 
changed some of their behaviors because of it), and (ii) since Jones and Kammen (2011) 
report that changes in mobility and dietary footprint behaviors have the highest poten-
tial to abate carbon emissions (comparatively low upfront “costs” versus the subsequent 
GHGE reductions), that I will only analyze respondent mobility and dietary footprints. 
Th us, to be clear, my research question is, “Does ACC belief play a moderating role in 
the income-carbon relationship?” and my hypothesis – in accordance with the literature 
– is that it does not.
4. METHODS
For the U.S. research, I used the weighted, nationally representative dataset Climate 
Change in the American Mind survey (CCAMS; N=2107).23 Th e 2008 CCAMS has 
speciﬁ c carbon calculator inputs from car ownership (year, make, model, and usage), air 
travel, and dietary type. 24 Th ese carbon calculations were analyzed both separately and 
21 Th e terms mobility and transportation are used synonymously.
22 Even though studies have examined the socio-economic distribution of carbon emissions in the U.S. 
(Jones and Kammen, 2014; Ummel, 2014) and third party carbon calculators that are publicly available 
(Lynas, 2007; Padgett et al., 2008), as well as numerous studies (in the US) on the public distribution of 
climate change belief and risk perceptions (Guber, 2013; Howe et al., 2015; Leiserowitz et al., 2012, 2014; 
Leiserowitz and Feinberg, 2005), a combined analysis of carbon calculations in relation to climate change 
belief is not present in the literature.
23 Th is ongoing nationally representative survey has been the source of various research and reports – see 
the Yale (2015) website. Amongst other things, this survey tracks and examines public understanding of 
climate change in the U.S.: its causes, how risks are perceived, and possible consequences. For more detail, 
see Maibach et al. (2011:7-8).
24 Air travel calculations were based on four questions which queried (1) how many short distance (up to 
300 miles), (2) medium distance (between 300 and 1,000 miles), (3) long distance (between 1,000 and 
3,000 miles), or (4) overseas ﬂ ights a respondent “usually takes each year”. Dietary carbon calculations were 
based on respondent dietary type, i.e. plant-based (vegetarian, vegan) or meat-based (i.e. omnivore). Th is 
data was used in conjunction with diﬀ erent recommended dietary guidelines by respondent age and gender 
(USDA, 2010; USDA-ERS, 2014).
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added into one mobility-dietary footprint – a total yearly rate of GHGEs per person (kg-
CO2e/adult-yr) – the primary dependent variable in my analyses. Lifestyles were opera-
tionalized as personal GHGEs, i.e. carbon lifestyles, but in a reduced mobility-dietary 
version. In operationalizing ACC belief, I utilized the Six Americas belief segmentation 
as provided by the CCAMS (Maibach et al., 2011), and these ACC beliefs are segment-
ed into six types: Alarmed, Concerned, Cautious, Disengaged, Doubtful, and Dismissive.25
Th e concept of lock-in – a main theme of this research – was examined relationally as 
the correspondence between household income and the mobility-dietary footprint – 
see Figure 2 below.26 Th is relationship was tested to examine the degree to which it is 
moderated by ACC belief.27 Finally, I also introduced the “standard fare” of demograph-
ic variables: gender, age, race, ethnicity, education, political ideology, and household 
size. As census tract locations were available for the CCAMS respondents, I introduced 
census tract data from the American Community Survey (US Census Bureau, 2015) 
speciﬁ cally: population density, educational attainment, and median income levels for 
respondent census tracts.28 Th us, with census tract data I was able to test for “neighbor-








Source:  Author’s adaption from Baron and Kenny (1986).
Figure 2 . Anthropogenic climate change belief moderating income-footprint path model
25 Th e signiﬁ ers ACC belief and CCAMS segmentation are used synonymously.
26 Th e terms household income and income are used synonymously, and always mean household income.
27 Moderation as deﬁ ned by Baron and Kenny (1986) includes a test for interaction eﬀ ects as seen in Figure 
2: household income multiplied by ACC belief.
28 Th e ACS years 2006-2010 consist of a ﬁ ve-year estimate of census data and are considered the most 
appropriate for the 2008 CCAMS dataset.
29 Th e CCAMS also had a dichotomous metropolitan statistical area (MSA) measure – MSA / non-MSA 
– and this measure was also utilized in my analyses.
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5. FINDINGS
These ﬁ ndings were derived from four diﬀ erent ordinary least squares regression 
analyses, in which I tested the eﬀ ects of ACC belief on the income-carbon relati-
onship. Th e diﬀ erent analyses consisted of a combined total and three dimensions of 
that total: (1) the individual motor vehicle carbon footprint, (2) the air travel carbon 
footprint, (3) the dietary footprint, and (4) a combined total mobility and dietary car-
bon footprint.30 Each of these analyses was conducted on the same set of independent 
variables. Th e total mobility and dietary footprint is the summation of the two mobility 
footprints – vehicle and air – and the dietary footprint.
Descriptive statistics detailing the summations of the total mobility-dietary footprint 
– all sample respondent footprints (N=2107) added together – can be seen in Table 1. 
Approximately 56% of this sum total is due to motor vehicle use, 24% to dietary 
habits, and 13% to air travel – see Figure 3. Th ough all sample respondents (100%) 
are represented in the dietary footprint, only 88% (N=1859) and 37% (N=784) of res-
pondents contribute to vehicle and air travel footprints, respectively. In other words, 
about 12% of the sample did not report motor vehicle use and 63% did not usually 
ﬂ y each year.31 Also, in Table 1, dietary GHGEs appear to be the most normal with 
mean, median, and mode values relatively close to each other; this is not the case for 
vehicle or ﬂ ight GHGEs.



















































Mean 6.312 2.218 2.695 11.224
Median 3.512 0.00 2.674 7.452
Mode 0.00 0.00 2.188 2.431








Representation (88.2%) (37.2%) (100.0%)
30 Th ese dependent variables have units of measure in tons of CO2 over a one year period of time (tCO2/
yr).
31 Note: the median value for air travel is zero.
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Figure 3. Composition of total mobility-dietary footprint.
5.1. Stratifi ed Emissions and the Income-Carbon Relationship
Before detailing the multi-variate regression analyses, I review a number of bivariate ﬁ g-
ures which visually illustrate the stratiﬁ cation of the mobility-dietary footprint. Figure 
4 depicts the sum totals of respondent GHGEs by population quintiles. 
Figure 4. Carbon emissions by population quintiles.
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Figure  5. Carbon quintiles – relative proportions.
When moving from left to right, from the lowest emitter quintile group to the highest, 
a near exponential increase can be seen. 
Similar to other studies (Chancel, 2014; Ummel, 2014), Figure 4 illustrates the level of 
emissions inequality: the top 20% of the sample emits more mobility-dietary carbon 
than the combined total of the bottom 80%. Th e separate footprints which comprise 
the total carbon footprint can also be observed. Th ough dietary GHGEs remain near 
constant, there are – when moving left to right – near exponential increases in ﬂ ight and 
vehicle footprint. In the lowest quintile, dietary carbon dominates emissions, while in 
the top quintile, it occupies a smaller fraction. Figure 5 depicts the very same data but 
as relative quintile proportions. Again, stark variances across the quintiles can be seen.
5.2. Linear Regression Analyses
Table 2 below displays the standardized models of the four regression analyses.32 Along 
the left side of Table 2 are the independent variables: demographics, political ideology, 
neighborhood eﬀ ects, household income, and ACC belief – I dichotomized ACC belief 
32 Prior to the dichotomization of the CCAMS belief variable into Alarmed and Non-Alarmed respondents, 
I ran two analyses which examined a reduced catchment of respondent attitudes: (i) the degree of certainty 
of one’s global warming beliefs, (ii) the aﬃ  rmation that it is human caused, and (iii) a broader catchment of 
attitudes – the individual segments of the CCAMS belief construct. Aside from some air travel, I found no 
association between belief and emissions from these early analyses and this ﬁ nding informed my decision to 
dichotomize the CCAMS belief variable which was an integral factor to the construction of Table 2.
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into Alarmed and Non-Alarmed respondents.33 Th e bottom rows contain values for the 
adjusted R2, F ratio, and number of observations. Column 1 displays the ﬁ nal regression 
output for vehicle carbon footprint per year (tCO2/yr); column 2, the dietary regres-
sion; column 3, the ﬂ ight footprint; and column 4 the total mobility-dietary footprint.
Th e dietary footprint model has the greatest predictive capacity with an R2 value of .813 
and an F ratio of 416.424 (p<.01); the most powerful predictors are gender and age 
with signiﬁ cant negative correlations for female at b=-.798 (p<.01) and age at b=-.350 
(p<.01).34 Th e total mobility-dietary footprint is the next model in terms of explana-
tory capacity with an R2 of .119 and an F ratio of 13.903 (p<.01). Th e strength of this 
model may be a partial “carry over” of the dietary footprint – with a signiﬁ cant negative 
correlation for female at b=-.106 (p<.01); however, household income is the greatest 
predictor in this model with a signiﬁ cant positive correlation at b=.320 (p<.01). House-
hold size also has notable predictive capacity in this model with a signiﬁ cant negative 
correlation at b=-.128 (p<.01).
When looking across the rows: age, household size, household income, the Income* 
Alarmed interactions are consistently signiﬁ cant. Age tends toward a signiﬁ cant negative 
correlation suggesting that people are emitting less carbon as they get older. Household 
size is more mixed, with a signiﬁ cant positive correlation for dietary footprint (b=.045; 
p<.01), but a signiﬁ cant negative correlation for vehicle footprint (b=-.112; p<.01) and 
total footprint (b=-.128; p<.01). Th ese correlations suggest that individuals who live in 
larger households eat more of a meat-based diet, but they also have more passengers in 
their cars (reducing one’s vehicle footprint) and ﬂ y less.
Except for dietary footprint, household income is a consistently signiﬁ cant positive pre-
dictor across all the regression analyses.35 It  is most highly correlated with the total mo-
bility-dietary footprint at b=.320 (p<.01). Dietary footprint aside, the Income*Alarmed 
interaction in the climate change belief category is also a consistent, signiﬁ cantly nega-
tive factor in these models, with its strongest predictive capacity in the total footprint at 
b=-.161 (p<.01).For those who are more highly educated (bachelor’s degree and above), 
there are signiﬁ cant positive correlations for ﬂ ight footprint and total footprint. Also, 
in the political ideology category, those who identify as liberal have signiﬁ cant nega-
tive correlations for dietary footprint but signiﬁ cant positive correlations for ﬂ ight foot-
33 Besides including respondents who are more female, educated, liberal, and from more highly educated 
census tracts – the Alarmed demographic is not that diﬀ erent from the Non-Alarmed. For more detail, see 
Table 3 of the Appendix.
34 Th e sheer explanatory power of this model – nearly implausible – must be attributed to the calculation 
of the dietary footprint which was heavily based on respondent age and gender (see footnote 24).
35 Th e CCAMS household income is a variable with nineteen intervals: (1) Less than $5,000; (2) $5,000 to 
$7,499; (3) $7,500 to $9,999; (4) $10,000 to $12,499; (5) $12,500 to $14,999; (6) $15,000 to $19,999; 
(7) $20,000 to $24,999; (8) $25,000 to $29,999; (9) $30,000 to $34,999; (10) $35,000 to $39,999; 
(11) $40,000 to $49,999; (12) $50,000 to $59,999; (13) $60,000 to $74,999; (14) $75,000 to $84,999; 
(15) $85,000 to $99,999; (16) $100,000 to $124,999; (17) $125,000 to $149,999; (18) $150,000 to 
$174,999; (19) $175,000 or more.
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print; perhaps these correlations cancel each other out as they are not seen in the total 
footprint. Th ere are also signiﬁ cant positive correlations between those who identify as 
somewhat conservative and the vehicle footprint (b=.060; p<.05) and the total footprint 
(b=.055; p<.05). Finally, there are signiﬁ cant negative correlations between census tract 
population density and the vehicle footprint (b=-.075; p<.01) and the total footprint 
(b=-.051; p<.05). I will discuss these ﬁ ndings in more depth below.
Figure 6 below was constructed with values from the total mobility-dietary footprint 
and illustrates the interaction of income and climate change beliefs.36 Th e vertical axis 
represents tons of CO2 per year and the horizontal axis is the CCAMS household in-
come intervals.37 When compared to the slope of the Alarmed (gray line), it can be seen 
that with respect to income the total footprint of the Non-Alarmed (black line) rises 
more sharply. Also, around income interval 6 – household income of $20,000/year, 
there is something of an income tipping point where the eﬀ ect of ACC belief (being 
Alarmed) begins to have a greater impact on respondent carbon footprint. Figure 6, 
then, illustrates that the greatest eﬀ ect of being Alarmed occurs in the highest income 
brackets, which is also where carbon emissions are the largest and where there is both a 
greater need and capacity for emission reductions.
Figure 6. Interaction of household income and climate change belief on total mobility-die-
tary footprint 
36 Th ese are unstandardized emissions values.
37 See footnote 35 for detail on these intervals.
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Table 2.  Th e primary carbon models regressed on demographics, political ideology, 

























































(Constant) - *** - *** .** - ***
Age -0.050** -0.350*** -0.047* -0.080***
Male .-- .-- .-- .--
Female -0.103*** -0.798*** 0.004 -0.106***
High school or less .-- .-- .-- .--
Some college/Assoc. 0.010 0.006 -0.027 -0.008
Bachelor’s degree 0.019 0.016 0.042 0.041*
Master’s or more -0.001 0.000 0.082*** 0.049**
White .-- .-- .-- .--
Black 0.027 0.005 0.056** 0.056**
Other (Non-Hispanic) -0.034 -0.009 0.065*** 0.013
Hispanic 0.029 -0.039*** 0.037 0.044**
Two or more races 0.020 0.002 0.002 0.017
Household size -0.112*** 0.045*** -0.066*** -0.128***
Moderate .-- .-- .-- .--
Very liberal -0.025 -0.039*** 0.063*** 0.017
Somewhat liberal -0.026 -0.022** 0.066*** 0.019
Somewhat conservative 0.060** 0.013 0.011 0.055**
Very conservative 0.007 0.005 -0.032 -0.014
Item non-response -0.024 0.000 -0.005 -0.022
CT Median income 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.001
CT % BA degree -0.070** 0.001 0.016 -0.046
MSA status 0.016 0.000 0.027 0.029
CT Pop. density -0.075*** 0.015 0.013 -0.051**
Household income 0.233*** -0.020* 0.222*** 0.320***
Non-Alarmed .-- .-- .-- .--
Alarmed 0.045 -0.062*** 0.078 0.081
Income * Alarmed -0.099* 0.002 -0.134** -0.161***
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.813 0.075 0.119
F value 8.586*** 416.424*** 8.725*** 13.903***
Number  of Observations 2107 2107 2107 2107
Source: Climate Change in the American Mind Survey (2008); US Census Bureau (2015); Abbre-
viations: CT = Census Tract; MSA = Metropolitan Statistical Area; .-- indicates reference category, * 
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p <.01 
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this discussion I focus on the object of this research: the moderating capacities of 
ACC belief on the income-carbon relationship. I also concentrate more on the total 
mobility-dietary carbon footprint, rather than the individual regression models. Ad-
ditionally, it is perhaps good to recall that this data is from 2008 and the scope of this 
research only includes reported mobility-dietary behaviors and their related GHGEs 
– in other words, there are other carbon emissive behaviors related to human behavior.
Starting with the demographic variables, there are signiﬁ cant negative correlations with 
age. Th is dynamic may be due to “life roles” attributable to age, i.e. life course and / or 
workforce characteristics, or generational age cohort characteristics. It may well be due 
to people becoming more settled and comparatively consuming, ﬂ ying and driving less 
as they get older. Setting air travel aside, the signiﬁ cant negative correlations for female 
may be related to the traditional – though changing – gender separation of labor, with 
men out of the house and driving more than women. Interestingly, this “travel-for-work 
dynamic” was not evident with the ﬂ ight footprint.38 
Educational attainment oﬀ ers something of a mixed eﬀ ect. Higher education – bach-
elor’s degree and above – positively contributed, on average, to air travel carbon emis-
sions, and this was reﬂ ected in the total footprint. Th is may have to do with the de-
mands, apart from income, of one’s occupation. Th ese eﬀ ects of education, independent 
of income, may be due to cultural characteristics which align well with Bourdieu’s 
([1979]1984) insights into education and class culture – where cultural drivers to main-
tain social status and symbolic capital may outpace economic drivers.
When considering the total mobility-dietary footprint, there are signiﬁ cant positive cor-
relations to be seen with Black and Hispanic (compared to White). Th ere is perhaps a 
cultural attribute beneath these correlations; the Black correlation appears to be a direct 
carry-over from the ﬂ ight footprint: Are Blacks ﬂ ying relatively more for some reason? 
Might this be a consequence of migration and respondent visits to countries of origin? 
Th is requires further research. Th e positive Hispanic correlation, however, seems to re-
sult from a sum of parts, as it is not present in the other models – though it is present, 
negatively, in dietary carbon. Th e race / ethnicity category of other (non-Hispanic) had a 
signiﬁ cant positive correlation for air travel footprint. However, this correlation did not 
carry over to the total mobility-dietary footprint.
When considering household size, it perhaps helps to consider how more people in 
one’s home – both through social norms and sheer consumptive needs – aﬀ ects behav-
ior. Firstly, there is probably an association between household size and the number of 
passengers usually in someone’s vehicle – number of passengers was a denominator in 
the respondent vehicle footprint calculations. Accordingly, there are signiﬁ cant negative 
correlations with vehicle and total carbon footprint. Th ere is also, though, a signiﬁ -
cant negative correlation with ﬂ ight footprint: might ﬂ ying be too expensive for large 
38 Again, some of these age and gender correlations may be attributable to the dietary footprint calculation.
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families or do they have trouble “getting away”? Concerning dietary GHGEs, there is 
a signiﬁ cant positive correlation with household size. Perhaps it is diﬃ  cult for people 
from larger homes to moderate their dietary choices (i.e. “go vegetarian”); however, this 
requires further research.
When considering political ideology in the total mobility-dietary footprint, there is a sig-
niﬁ cant positive correlation for only one political response: somewhat conservative. Th is 
particular correlation appears to be attributable to, and a “carry-over” from, the vehicle 
footprint. Interestingly, somewhat conservative is the second largest ideological population 
(23%) and it may be representative, as far as car use, of a commuter culture. Th ere is 
also a signiﬁ cant negative correlation between vehicle GHGEs and population density, 
which seems to align with a “commuter culture” frame and Bourdieu’s ([1979]1984, 
[1993]1999) views on lifestyles and site eﬀ ects. However, this requires more research. 
Concerning those with more liberal ideological tendencies and their signiﬁ cant negative 
correlations with dietary footprint and, conversely, signiﬁ cant positive correlations with 
ﬂ ying: perhaps these contrary tendencies resolve themselves as there are no signiﬁ cant 
correlations related to liberal responses in the total mobility-dietary footprint.
Neighborhood eﬀ ects were primarily found relative to the motor vehicle. Concerning 
the signiﬁ cant negative correlation between census tract population density and both 
vehicle and total GHGEs (i.e. the more dense a census tract, the less car usage), there is 
evidence in the literature for this relationship: those in more urban areas “share” more 
resources, have greater access to public transportation, and drive less (Dargay, 2002; 
Heinonen et al., 2013; Jones and Kammen, 2014).39 Th ere is also a signiﬁ cant negative 
correlation between census tract percentage of bachelor degrees (or above) and vehicle 
footprint; apparently census tracts with higher levels of education are producing rela-
tively lower driving impacts. Th is particular relationship, though, did not carry over 
into the total mobility-dietary footprint.
6.1. Household Income and Climate Change Belief
Conﬁ rming the literature, household income – dietary carbon aside – had the largest 
signiﬁ cant impact of any independent variable. Th is ﬁ nding reaﬃ  rms the established 
“income-carbon” relationship, the “inequalities” of carbon emissions, and lifestyle lock-
in.40 When examining the total footprint for a ﬁ nding concerning the main question 
animating this research: Does ACC belief moderate the income-carbon relationship?, the 
ﬁ nding is mixed and depends on what is meant by “belief ”. For strong “believers” like 
the CCAMS composite construct Alarmed, the answer is yes: ACC belief does moderate 
the income-carbon relationship. However, for those who are not strong believers, like 
the CCAMS Concerned or Cautious, the answer is no: this belief is not strong enough. 
39 However, Heinonen et al. (2013) also argue that some overlooked behaviors may oﬀ set the “urban 
advantage” of proximity.
40 Rather than thinking of income as a medium for buying and disposing of products, energy and emi-
ssions, it could be thought of as a proxy for a set of normative, socially positioned behaviors – an income 
lifestyle, a class culture.
Soc. ekol. Zagreb, Vol. 25 (2016.), No. 1-2
Jean Léon Boucher: Culture, Carbon, and Climate Change: A Class Analysis of Climate Change Belief...
70
Th us, since the strongest ACC believer – the Alarmed – has demonstrated the potential 
to bridge the A-B gap; I reject my original null hypothesis.
Th is is not the ﬁ rst time scholars report that strong attitudes can overcome certain con-
texts (Guagnano et al., 1995) and with this ﬁ nding I argue against the proponents of an 
A-B gap (Blake, 1999; Csutora, 2012; Gatersleben et al., 2002; Hoggett, 2013; Koll-
muss and Agyeman, 2002; Whitmarsh et al., 2011; Wilson et al., 2013). Additionally, 
I align myself with scholars who argue that, essentially, the A-B gap is a measurement 
problem (Guber, 2013; Lertzman, 2013; Newhouse, 1990). In other words, there is no 
gap when a larger catchment of human concerns – like the multifaceted CCAMS belief 
construct – is considered in aggregate.41 
In concl usion, I must reiterate that the income-carbon moderating capacity of the 
strong ACC attitude is slight and that – dietary emissions aside – income remains the 
most dominant predictive variable of GHGEs. Th is means that though an A-B gap may 
have been bridged, it may not make a great environmental diﬀ erence. Th us, in light 
of this ﬁ nding – that regardless of climate change belief those with the lowest incomes 
generally emit the lowest amounts of CO2, I recommend policy tools – such as greater 
taxes and limits on both income and carbon emissions – that more directly constrain 
personal carbon emissive behaviors. Similar to the arguments of others, it appears that 
the most eﬀ ective place to create environmentally signiﬁ cant behavioral change is at the 
structural, governmental, and institutional level (IPCC, 2014a; Princen et al., 2002; 
Szasz, 2011). However, I do not suggest this because I think culture and behavior are 
not powerful areas for creating change, but because I think it is diﬃ  cult to intention-
ally generate change in these areas.
41 Th ere may be a gap between environmental attitudes and environmental behaviors, but human beings 
are not unidimensional.
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Appendix
Table 3. Average and frequency information for the Alarmed including demographics, 
political ideology, neighborhood eﬀ ects, household income, and climate beliefs.
Average or  Frequency of Variable Signiﬁ cance  of 
Diﬀ erenceAlarmed Non-Alarmed
Median Age 50 yrs 45 yrs t = -.886 (p=.376)
Gender
% Male 38.5% 50.3%
c2 = 17.7 (p=.000)% Female 61.5% 49.7%
Education
% High school or less 33.5% 46.8%
c2 = 38.3 (p=.000)
% Some college/Assoc. 28.2% 27.8%
% Bachelor’s degree 22.7% 17.8%
% Master’s/above 
professional,  or doctoral 15.7% 7.6%
Race/Ethnicity
% White (Non-Hispanic) 66.3% 70.1%
c2 = 3.6 (p=.460)
% Black (Non-Hispanic) 10.9% 11.2%
% Other (Non-Hispanic) 6.1% 5.2%
% Hispanic 15% 12.4%
% Two or more races 
 (Non-Hispanic) 1.7% 1.0%
Household
Household size 2.47 persons 2.55 persons t = .975 (p=.330)
Household income
$50,000 - $59,999 
 (median cat selection)
$50,000 - $59,999 
 (median cat.selection)
t = -.217 (p=.828)
Political ideology
Very liberal 15.7% 4.0%
c2 = 149.5 (p=.000)
Somewhat liberal 32.1% 18.7%
Moderate 38.4% 39.7%
Somewhat conservative 10.9% 26.1%
Very conservative 2.8% 10.6%
Item non-response 0.1% 0.9%
Neighborhood eﬀ ects
CT median income $55,278 $53,820 t = -1.04 (p=.297)
CT % BA degree 30.79% 27.13% t = -3.38 (p=.001)
MSA status 86.7% 83.0% c2 = 2.95 (p=.086)
CT Pop. density 6119.03 pers/mile2 4612.46 pers/mile2 t = -1.80 (p=.072)
CCAMS belief segmentation
Alarmed 18.0%  
Non-Alarmed  82.0%
All Totals / Sample Size 100.0% / 380 100.0%  / 1727
Source: Climate Change in the American Mind Survey (2008); US Census Bureau, American 
Community Survey 5-year Estimate, 2006-2010 (US Census Bureau, 2015).
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KULTURA, UGLJIČNI DIOKSID I KLIMATSKE PROMJENE: KLASNA 
ANALIZA VJEROVANJA U KLIMATSKE PROMJENE, INERTNOSTI 
ŽIVOTNOG STILA I OSOBNOG UGLJIČNOG OTISKA
Jean Léon Boucher
Sažetak 
Globalne klimatske promjene jedno su od najvažnijih pitanja današnjice a emisije ugljičnog dioksida među 
glavnih krivcima za postojeće stanje. Ranija su istraživanja pokazala da su emisije ugljičnog dioksida usko 
povezane s visinom prihoda kućanstava – kako unutar određene države tako i usporedbom između država. 
Jedan od temeljnih razloga navedene veze između prihoda i emisija ugljičnog dioksida istraživači pronalaze 
u inertnosti životnog stila: nesposobnosti pojedinaca da izmijene svoje potrošačke navike zbog instituciona-
liziranih struktura, konteksta u kojima žive i vladajućih normi. Na reprezentativnom uzorku Sjedinjenih 
Američkih Država (N=2107) provjerili smo korelaciju između vjerovanja u klimatske promjene i odnosa 
između prihoda i emisija ugljičnog dioksida (emisije se odnose na ugljični otisak izmjeren isključivo za osob-
nu mobilnost i način prehrane). Pronašli smo statistički značajne pozitivne korelacije između vjerovanja u 
klimatske promjene i osobnog ugljičnog otiska kod samo jednog dijela populacije – onih koji su najzabrinutiji 
oko klimatskih promjena (18% uzorka). Dodatno, potvrdili smo statistički značajnu pozitivnu korelaciju 
između prihoda kućanstva i emisija ugljičnog dioksida – prihodi su se pokazali najjačim prediktorom. U radu 
predlažemo oporezivanje i ograničavanje kako prihoda tako i emisija ugljičnog dioksida.
Ključne riječi: osobni ugljični otisak, ekološko ponašanje, ekološki stavovi, inertnost životnog stila, vje-
rovanje u klimatske promjene
KULTUR, KOHLENSTOFFDIOXID UND KLIMAWANDEL: 
KLASSENANALYSE DES GLAUBENS AN DEN KLIMAWANDEL, TRÄGHEIT 
DES LEBENSSTILS UND PERSÖNLICHER CO2-FUßABDRUCK
Jean Léon Boucher
Zusammenfassung
Der globale Klimawandel ist eine der wichtigsten Fragen der Gegenwart und die Kohlenwasserstoﬀ emission 
eine der Hauptursachen dieses Zustands. Vorherige Forschungen haben gezeigt, dass die Kohlenwasserstoﬀ e-
mission eng verbunden ist mit der Einkommenshöhe der Haushalte, sowohl innerhalb eines Staates als auch 
im Vergleich unter Staaten. Einen der Hauptgründe der genannten Verbindung zwischen Einkommen und 
Kohlenwasserstoﬀ emission sehen die Forscher in Trägheit des Lebensstils: der Unfähigkeit des Einzelnen 
nämlich, seine Verbrauchergewohnheiten zu ändern infolge der institutionalisierten Strukturen, des Le-
benskontextes und der vorherrschenden Normen. 
An einem repräsentativen Muster der USA (N=2107) haben wir die Korrelierung zwischen dem Glauben 
an die Klimaänderung und dem Verhältnis des Einkommens und der Kohlenwasserstoﬀ emission geprüft 
(Emissionen beziehen sich ausschließlich auf den CO2-Fußabdruck für persönliche Mobilität und Ernäh-
rungsweise). Wir haben statistisch bedeutende positive Korrelierungen gefunden zwischen dem Glauben 
an den Klimawandel und dem persönlichen CO2-Fußabdruck bei nur einem Teil der Population – bei 
denjenigen nämlich, die sich wegen des Klimawandels am meisten Sorgen machen (18% des Musters). 
Außerdem haben wir statistisch bedeutende positive Korrelierungen zwischen dem Haushaltseinkommen 
und den CO2-Emissionen bestätigt – die Einkünfte haben sich als der stärkste Prädiktor gezeigt. Deshalb 
schlagen wir Besteuerung und Begrenzung sowohl von Einkünften als auch von CO2-Emissionen vor. 
Schlüsselwörter: persönlicher CO2-Fußabdruck, ökologisches Verhalten, Stellungnahmen zum Umwelt-
schutz, Trägheit des Lebensstils, Glauben an den Klimawandel
